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Psychological Bulletin 2000, Vol. 126, No. 5, 703-726

Gender Differences in Moral Orientation: A Meta-Analysis

Sara Jaffee and Janet Shibley Hyde University of Wisconsin—Madison

C. Gilligan’s (1982) critique of L. Kohlberg’s theory of moral reasoning and her assertion that two modes

of moral reasoning (justice and care) exist have been the subject of debate within the field of psychology

for more than 15 years. This meta-analysis was conducted to review quantitatively the work on gender

differences in moral orientation. The meta-analysis revealed small differences in the care orientation

favoring females (d = -.28) and small differences in the justice orientation favoring males (d = .19).

Together, the moderator variables accounted for 16% of the variance in the effect sizes for care reasoning

and 17% of the variance in the effect sizes for justice reasoning. These findings do not offer strong

support for the claim that the care orientation is used predominantly by women and that the justice

orientation is used predominantly by men.

The 1982 publication of Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice

marked one of those rare moments when social science research

breaches the ivied walls of academia and captures the public’s

imagination. Gilh’gan’s assertion that females and males speak in

different moral voices—a care voice characterized by the desire to

maintain relationships and to respond to others’ needs and a justice

voice characterized by considerations of fairness and equity—

resonated with readers’ experience (Mednick, 1989). Ms. maga-

zine named Gilligan its 1984 Woman of the Year, lauding her for

research that “created a new appreciation for a previously uncata-

logued female sensibility, as well as possibilities for new under-

standing between the genders” (Van Gelder, 1984, p. 37). In 1996,

Time magazine included Gilligan among its “Time 25″—25 inno-

vative Americans with the ability “to show us the world anew, to

educate and entertain us, to change the way we think about

ourselves and others” (‘Time 25,” 1996, p. 54). Wrote the editors,

How likely is it that a single book could change the rules of psychol-

ogy, change the assumptions of medical research, change the conver-

sation among parents and teachers and developmental professionals

about the distinctions between men and women, boys and girls? (p. 66)

More than 15 years after the publication of this influential work,

are its theses supported by available scientific data?

Gilligan’s (1982) research on female moral reasoning chal-

lenged cognitive-developmental stage theories of moral develop-

ment on two fronts. First, she argued for a broader conceptualiza-

tion of moral reasoning that encompassed a care orientation as well

as a justice orientation. The care orientation is characterized by a

focus on maintaining relationships, responding to the needs of

others, and a responsibility not to cause hurt. The justice orienta-

Sara Jaffee and Janet Shibley Hyde, Department of Psychology, Uni-

versity of Wisconsin—Madison.

We would like to acknowledge the contributions of Rose Jadack and

MaryBeth Nolan to this project. The Graduate School of the University of

Wisconsin provided financial support.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Janet

Shibley Hyde, Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin—

Madison, 1202 W. Johnson Street, Madison, Wisconsin 53706.

tion is concerned with principles of fairness and equity such as

those assessed in conventional measures of moral reasoning (Gil-

ligan, 1982). Although acknowledging that males and females

could use either a justice or a care perspective, Gilligan asserted

that care reasoning was used predominantly by females and justice

reasoning was used predominantly by males (Gilligan, 1982; Gil-

ligan & Attanucci, 1988). Second, she argued that Kohlberg’s

Moral Judgment Interview (MJI; Colby et al., 1987)—the most

widely used measure of moral reasoning—was gender biased

because it was validated on an all-male sample and because its

scoring scheme characterized considerations of care and response

as less sophisticated than considerations of justice and fairness.

Over the last 15 years, Gilligan’s (1982) work has inspired a

wealth of empirical research and criticism, some of which has

supported her claims and some of which has not. At the same time,

researchers have seldom agreed on how Gilligan’s care and justice

orientations should be defined or how they should be measured.

Consequently, it has been difficult to compare the results of these

studies. The goal of this article is to evaluate Gilligan’s assertions

that (a) there are gender differences in Kohlbergian moral stage

and (b) the care and justice orientations are gender related. The

former assertion has been reviewed meta-analytically by several

investigators, and those results are summarized here. Meta-

analysis was used in the present paper to evaluate the latter

assertion. In addition, a number of complexities surrounding the

study of gender and moral reasoning are reviewed. The following

sections present Gilligan’s theory of moral reasoning, as well as

the criticisms of this work.

Gilligan’s Theory of Moral Reasoning

Gilligan’s (1977, 1982) theory of moral reasoning stemmed

from Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmental stage theory of moral

development. Kohlberg (1969, 1976, 1984) proposed that individ-

uals progress through a sequence of invariant and universal stages

of moral reasoning. These six stages are grouped into three levels,

each of which represents a qualitative advance in the individual’s

ability to understand and integrate diverse points of view (Kohl-

berg, 1976).

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Early research on Kohlbergian moral development reported that

Stage 3 was the modal stage for females and Stage 4 was the modal

stage for males (Fishkin, Keniston, & MacKinnon, 1973; Haan,

Smith, & Block, 1968; Holstein, 1969; Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969;

Poppen, 1974). Stage 3 reasoning is characterized by the desire to

maintain relationships and to meet others’ expectations, and

Stage 4 is characterized by a law-and-order mentality in which

laws are upheld so as to maintain the social order. These findings

led some researchers to accuse Kohlberg’s theory of gender bias

(Gilligan, 1977, 1982; Haan, 1978). Specifically, Gilligan (1977,

1982) argued that because Kohlberg derived his theory of moral

development from an all-male sample, he neglected to recognize a

distinctively female mode of moral reasoning—one that is char-

acterized by a desire to maintain relationships and a responsibility

not to cause hurt. This care orientation contrasts with a distinc-

tively male mode of moral reasoning—the justice orientation—

that is based on the abstract principles of justice, fairness, and

individualism captured by Kohlberg’s MJI. Unlike Kohlberg’s

moral stages, the care and justice orientations do not represent

cognitive structures that develop in a stagelike sequence. Instead,

they represent frameworks that can be modified by experience and

through which individuals interpret and resolve moral problems.

However, Gilligan argued that the care orientation’s emphasis on

maintaining relationships led to its classification as a Stage 3

response in Kohlberg’s scoring scheme.

Origins and Development of Moral Orientations

Gilligan and colleagues asserted that the care and justice orien-

tations are rooted in early childhood experiences of attachment and

inequality that foster, respectively, a relational and an individual-

istic self-concept (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Gilligan & Wig-

gins, 1987). Because children are born into a position of inequality

and cannot survive without an attachment figure, all children are

exposed to the conditions that form the basis of both moral

orientations. Thus, all individuals have the capacity to understand,

experience, or implement either moral orientation. The reason that

males and females come to use one mode of moral reasoning over

the other is that these experiences of attachment and inequality are

differentially reinforced in a society dichotomized by gender.

Working from Chodorow’s (1978) neopsychoanalytic account of

gender identity development, Gilligan proposed that because

women are the primary caretakers in most cultures, girls’ self-

concepts are based on a definition of themselves as similar to and

connected with their mothers whereas boys’ self-concepts are

rooted in their difference and separation from their mothers. More-

over, boys identify with their fathers, who may be perceived as

authority figures who hold power over them. Thus, the experience

of attachment and connection is more salient to girls, whereas the

experience of inequality and separation is more salient to boys.

These initial experiences of attachment and inequality may be

confirmed in later childhood and adolescence, resulting in an

association between gender and moral orientation (Gilligan &

Wiggins, 1987). Gilligan and Wiggins (1987) concluded:

The sex difference question, when framed in this way, does not carry

the implication that one sex is morally superior, nor does it imply that

moral behavior is biologically determined. Instead, it draws attention

to two perspectives on morality. To the extent that biological sex, the

psychology of gender, and the cultural norms and values that define

masculine and feminine behavior affect the experience of equality and

attachment, these factors presumably will influence moral develop-

ment, (p. 282)

Empirical Tests of Gilligan’s Developmental Theory

These claims about the origins and development of moral voice

are largely untested. Benenson, Morash, and Petrakos (1998) ob-

served 41 mother-child dyads (children were 4 and 5 years old) in

a play setting and found that, compared with boys, girls were

physically closer to their mothers, engaged in more mutual eye

contact with their…